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# UA ccTLD Resiliency During the War

Dmytro Kohmanyuk :: Hostmaster.UA  
Baltic Domain Days :: Rīga 2023.10.04  
.LV 30th anniversary

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# Disclaimer

1. This story is based on real events
2. Any errors or omissions are mine
3. Russian troops may be harmed during the presentation
4. Key message is: prepare early, keep your tools sharp

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# Preparation

**2021-12-01**

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# Preparation

1. Internal discussions started in late 2021
2. Mostly focused on redundancy, disaster preparedness
3. Focused on DNS service; most visible and impacting
4. Considered multiple outsourcing companies bidding
5. Several were in line up, only one tested
6. OOB communication: Signal and Google mail/docs
7. Weekly change routine established

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# DDOS Attack

2022-02-15

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# Impact

1. DNS Service for UA TLD and GOV.UA domains server
2. Took out one of our anycast nodes...
3. ...That was also zone transfer server
4. Impact: none of other UA zones did update
5. Lesson learned: separate public and private
6. Used Signal chat already established for ops team
7. Anycast fortunately remained available, mostly

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# Post-Impact

1. Deployed new anycast service at night...
2. ...which was configured incorrectly...
3. ...which was fixed after I contacted CEO on messenger
4. Lesson learned: know your CEO's direct contact
5. Press release about the attack
6. Created post-mortem write up, entire team participated
7. Created spare transfer server on unused host we had

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# Military Attack

2022-02-24

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# Events

1. 04:00 (like in 1941) Kyiv bombings started
2. I was awake at 06:00, accidentally
3. First reaction was denial and panic
4. Next was to call everyone in my team
5. I assessed the situation and created “to save” list
6. For major services, I had allocated a backup location
7. Signal team chat was used to communicate

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# Priorities

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1. PEOPLE
2. DATA
3. SERVICES
4. MONEY

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# Communication

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# Communication: who, what

1. Team (CHANGES)
2. Customers/Partners (IMPACT)
3. Public (SHORT)
4. VIP: Government, LOA, CERT, ...

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# Components

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1. PEOPLE
2. EPP service, back end database
3. DNSSEC Signing and key management, zone generation
4. DNS Service for TLD and our own domains
5. WHOIS and RDAP services
6. Websites for public, registrars, government, ...
7. Email, chat, phone\*, for support

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# Components, continued

8. Datacenter space, internet, networking hardware
9. Development infrastructure (Git)
10. DDOS Protection Services \*\*
11. Cloud services \*\*\*
12. Business back office (accounting, ticketing system)
13. BACKUPS

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# Decisions

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## Outsource or not?

1. Hardware, datacenter: YES and YES
2. DNS secondary service: YES – we got several
3. Registry, EPP and WHOIS: NO
4. Our business and financial operations - NO
5. Virtual servers - prefer our own virtualization
6. DNS primary and DNSSEC signing - NO
7. Calendars, documents, email – YES (Google Workspace)

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# Lessons

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# Lessons

1. Must have: server hosting company, multiple locations
2. Reach out to lots of people, select few to work with
3. Even with free help, keep track of estimated costs
4. People are more valuable than computers
5. Time is more valuable than money
6. Smaller companies usually react faster
7. Those that knew us already, were more helpful

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# Netnod

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# Netnod

1. contacted Netnod senior employees
2. received assurance of help, Signal group created
3. zones setup within 96 hours
4. Migration of infrastructure in stages
5. communication: signal chat, Google docs, emails
6. management and government was involved
7. Partner domains (Kharkiv.UA, Odesa.UA) included
8. Nice visibility, statistics

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# CZ.NIC

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# CZ.NIC

1. contacted CZNIC CEO
2. received assurance of help, CTO involved
3. first servers configured within 72 hours
4. Migration of infrastructure in many stages
5. communication: signal chat/calls, Google docs, email
6. DNS cluster designed, then re-designed again
7. Partner project (Secondary.net.UA) included
8. Pure IPv6 uplink to DNS node; dual FRR, VRRP

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**NIC.LV**

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# NIC.LV

1. Relationship with NIC.LV and its leadership established
2. Spread the word while we were executing the DRP
3. Volunteered to coordinate various helping parties
4. Maintaining server exchange for mutual benefit

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# Gratitude

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# Acknowledgements

1. 6connect, Anycast DNS: CloudNS, CDNS, Cloudflare, Gransy, Netnod, Packet Clearing House, RcodeZero
2. CZ.NIC for hosting our core infrastructure
3. Our colocation partners in Ukraine and abroad
4. IANA staff, for updating .UA NS on Sunday
5. CENTR, for suspending .RU membership twice
6. Netnod, RIPE, CSNOG (+3) for inviting to their meetings

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# Gratitude

1. My fellow colleagues, all of you
2. Ukrainian providers and partners, too many to list
3. NIC.LV and ]{, CZ.NIC z.s.p.o, Netnod AB, and [6connect](#)
4. MFA of Sweden: [Utrikesdepartementet](#)
5. [Global NOG Alliance](#) for helping ISPs in Ukraine
6. Many members of ccTLD, CENTR, and RIPE communities
7. Ukrainian armed forces (MIL.UA)

# Questions?

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[Hostmaster.UA](#)

Running UA ccTLD since 2001

Under Russian state  
military attacks since  
2014